Respond to prefers-color-scheme dark in app web views

Follow section front redirects in Spectrum

Enable NLP source in PCS for load testing

Switch off the News Alerts Survey Widget when we have enough responses

Poll to determine if new LUF updates are available

Allows the winning A/B test variant to be turned on without Spectrum deployment

Show infinite scrolling sections in Assembler MultiView

Show option for NLP article summaries in Action Bar

A general feature flag for Recipe Features that aren't yet released

Feature flag for media team features that aren't yet released

Use new Orca video player for preroll plugin in Spectrum

Show the snow tracker (instead of the heat tracker) on Spectrum

The New York Times, alone in its outrage over access to Biden

The ‘Access Hollywood’ video cemented Trump’s air of invincibility

Stephen A. Smith would like even more of your attention

Trump escalates attacks on prosecutors, says Democrats run ‘a Gestapo administration’

Top RNC lawyer resigns after rift grows with Trump

Divided Trump campaign weighs joining TikTok, the app he tried to ban

How Pope Francis opened the Vatican to transgender sex workers

Israeli cabinet votes to shut Al Jazeera’s Israel operations; cease-fire talks ongoing

Residents accuse Israeli forces of executions during West Bank raid

Strangers help Sesame Street puppeteer after heirloom necklace was stolen

Teen grabs wheel when driver passes out and school bus veers into traffic

Cat climbed into Amazon return box, found alive 630 miles away

Carolyn Hax: Working for a celebrity has this employee feeling ‘small’

Ask Amy: I live with my boyfriend – and his sister and her family

Miss Manners: Is it inappropriate to reach out to old girlfriends?

After years of delay, Boeing to try again with Starliner space capsule

Google’s empire is massive. A judge will soon rule if it’s a monopoly.

In photos: The 150th running of the Kentucky Derby

University of Michigan graduation disrupted by protesters

Protesters clash with law enforcement at U-Va.

The Post endorses April McClain Delaney and Tom Royals for Maryland’s 6th District

On Press Freedom Day, little to celebrate for Hong Kong’s journalists

Young Georgians want to be part of Europe. Their government is in the way.

A frank look at hot dog prices at MLB ballparks

Sloppy first inning dooms the Nationals in a 6-3 loss to the Blue Jays

In a pinch, the Nationals finally find some offense

The new cure-all for vacation excess: the IV drip 

What’s the best bus to New York? We tested 5 for comfort and value.

You asked: Do I need a passport for my cruise?

Mikhail Svetlov

The moment is etched in the lore of Vladimir Putin: The Berlin Wall had just succumbed to hammers, chisels and history, and a KGB officer still shy of 40 and stationed in Dresden, East Germany, was in a panic, burning documents and requesting military support as a crowd approached. “We cannot do anything without orders from Moscow,” Putin was told on the phone. “And Moscow is silent.” In an interview appearing in his 2000 book, “<a href="https://read.amazon.com/kp/embed?asin=B004OA64F2&preview=newtab&linkCode=kpe&ref_=cm_sw_r_kb_dp_E9VAQ3FKQ2G7AMG47X1B&tag=thewaspos09-20" target=_blank>First Person</a>,” Putin recalls that dreadful silence. “I got the feeling then that the country no longer existed,” he said. “That it had disappeared.” Two years after the wall went down, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics did, too. A decade after, Putin would ascend to power in Russia, talking about a revival.

The death of the Soviet Union, and Putin’s autopsy of the corpse, helps explain why he has risked a European conflict — and a confrontation with Washington — by launching a brutal assault on Ukraine. The U.S.S.R., he continued in that interview more than two decades ago, collapsed because it was suffering “a paralysis of power.” If the phrase sounds familiar, that’s because Putin repeated it in a defiant speech justifying his new war. The demise of the U.S.S.R., Putin <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-02-24/full-transcript-vladimir-putin-s-televised-address-to-russia-on-ukraine-feb-24" target=_blank>stated</a> on Feb. 24, “has shown us that the paralysis of power . . . is the first step toward complete degradation and oblivion.” The end of the Cold War, in his view, was not a matter of ideology or economics but of attitude and will. The Soviets blinked, and the Americans seized the opportunity. “We lost confidence for only one moment, but it was enough to disrupt the balance of forces in the world,” Putin declared. So much of what has followed — the unipolar era of U.S. supremacy that Putin reviles, the expansion of NATO he decries, the diminishment of Russia he rejects and the restoration he now seeks — only affirms his fixation on that moment.

“What Putin Really Wants” is a perennial topic for cable news debates and big-think magazine covers; the new invasion of Ukraine has prompted questions about the Russian leader’s <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/02/28/some-americans-others-are-questioning-putin-mental-state/" target="_blank">mental health</a> and pandemic-era <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/02/28/putin-bizarre-isolation/" target="_blank">isolation</a>. But his motives can also be gleaned in part from his book and his frequent essays and major speeches, all seething with resentment, propaganda and self-justification. In light of these writings, Russia’s attack on Ukraine seems less about reuniting two countries that Putin considers “a single whole,” as he put it in a lengthy <a href="https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/On_the_Historical_Unity_of_Russians_and_Ukrainians" target="_blank">essay</a> last year, than about challenging the United States and its NATO minions, those cocky, illegitimate winners of the Cold War. “Where did this insolent manner of talking down from the height of their exceptionalism, infallibility and all-permissiveness come from?” Putin demanded during his declaration of war. A world with one dominant superpower is “unacceptable,” he has stated, and he constantly warns that this imbalance — exemplified in NATO’s expansion — threatens Russia’s existence. “For our country, it is a matter of life and death,” he contends.

In “First Person,” a collection of interviews with Putin and various relatives and associates, he brags that he received top grades in high school, except for one subject. “I had gotten a B in composition,” he admits. If so, the teacher got it about right. His writing elsewhere veers from straightforward to overwrought, from reflective to overwhelmingly self-serving. Even so, these compositions serve as memos dictated for the archives of history: Putin’s attempts to strike a posture of perpetual defiance, to articulate a Russian exceptionalism immune from rules and norms. They portray a leader intent on redressing a perceived historical wrong inflicted on his country and himself, and a man convinced that Moscow must never fall silent again.

In late 1999, Putin, then prime minister, issued a <a href="https://pages.uoregon.edu/kimball/Putin.htm" target=_blank>long essay</a> on “Russia at the Turn of the Millennium,” lamenting his country’s deteriorating international standing. He blames Russia’s economic decline of the 1990s on the “historic futility” of Soviet-era communism and on “schemes taken from foreign textbooks,” a dig at the Western consultants who had parachuted in carrying market models and bullet-point reforms. With weak infrastructure, low foreign investment and lousy health indicators, Putin writes, Russia faced the real possibility of “sliding to the second, and possibly even third, echelon of world states.”

Nonetheless, Putin is adamant that the nation could be glorious once again, that “it is too early to bury Russia as a great power.” The answer is not a return to Communist Party values — they were “a road to a blind alley” — but a long-term strategy for economic development and moral, even spiritual, renewal. The details are hazy, but for one: “Russia needs a strong state power and must have it,” he declares. Putin couches that requirement in almost mystical terms. “From the very beginning, Russia was created as a supercentralized state,” he later explains in his book. “That’s practically laid down in its genetic code, its traditions, and the mentality of its people.”

Courtesy of PublicAffairs

The 1999 manifesto, published shortly before Boris Yeltsin resigned the presidency and handed power to Putin, is more grandiose than grand; Putin even considers Russia’s restoration among the “signal events” of the new millennium and the anniversary of Christendom. But when he argues that “responsible socio-political forces” should build the strategy for Russian renewal, it is pretty obvious whom Putin has in mind. In “First Person,” published the following year, he ponders his “historical mission,” praises the stability of monarchies and considers the possibility of amending the constitution to lengthen presidential terms. “Maybe four years is enough time to get things done,” he says. “But four years is a short term.” A colleague quoted in “First Person” who worked with Putin in the St. Petersburg mayor’s office in the early 1990s recalls how, rather than hang the standard portrait of Yeltsin in his office, Putin chose an image of Peter the Great. Russia’s glory is his goal, but Putin’s own power is always the convenient means.

Standing in the way of that greatness and power, Putin has long concluded, is the United States. Despite an early conciliatory tone — “We value our relations with the United States and care about Americans’ perception of us,” Putin wrote in a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1999/11/14/opinion/why-we-must-act.html">November 1999 op-ed</a> justifying Moscow’s crackdown against Chechen separatists, and after 9/11 he was among the first heads of state to offer Washington support — any pretense of rapprochement soon dissipated into antagonism. In 2007, Putin addressed an international security conference in Munich and, informing the audience that he would “avoid excessive politeness,” launched into a <a href="https://russialist.org/transcript-putin-speech-and-the-following-discussion-at-the-munich-conference-on-security-policy/" target="_blank">diatribe</a> against the U.S.-led post-Cold War system.

Could Obama have stopped Putin's election interference? A new book argues he didn't think he needed to.

“What is a unipolar world?” he asked. “It is a world in which there is one master, one sovereign.” He called this model not only “unacceptable” but “impossible,” and criticized Washington, mired in Iraq and Afghanistan, for having “overstepped its national borders in every way.” Putin assailed the NATO alliance for arraying its “frontline forces” on Russia’s borders, calling that a “serious provocation.” He complained that NATO and the European Union sought to supplant the United Nations (where, conveniently, Russia enjoys a Security Council veto) and that Western lectures on freedom were hypocritical cover for self-serving security policies: “Russia — we — are constantly being taught about democracy,” he said. “But for some reason those who teach us do not want to learn themselves.”

Moscow did not have to accept this imbalance of power, he argued: “Russia is a country with a history that spans more than a thousand years and has practically always used the privilege to carry out an independent foreign policy.” The invasion of Ukraine has <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2022/02/24/putin-invasion-ukraine-shape-new-world-order/" target=_blank>supposedly proved </a>his desire to upend and remake the international order, but Putin declared those intentions, publicly and clearly, long ago.

For The Washington Post

Last July, Putin published an <a href="https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/On_the_Historical_Unity_of_Russians_and_Ukrainians" target=_blank>essay</a> titled “On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians.” The two nations are really one people sharing a faith, culture and language, he asserts, and “modern Ukraine” is little more than a creation of the Soviet era. As always, he calls out nefarious foreign efforts to undermine this shared heritage, but he also laments how the Soviet Union, at its inception, mistakenly granted individual Soviet republics the right to secede. This “time bomb,” he writes, went off at the end of the Cold War, and the former Soviet satellite states “found themselves abroad overnight, taken away . . . from their historical motherland.”

From 2018: Books on the Russia scandal focus on the news. What they need is more history.

In their book, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/book-party/wp/2017/03/31/trumps-new-russia-expert-wrote-a-psychological-profile-of-vladimir-putin-and-it-should-scare-trump/">“Mr. Putin: Operative in the Kremlin,”</a> Fiona Hill and Clifford G. Gaddy write that Putin often deploys “useful history” — that he manipulates collective memory for personal and political goals, as a means to “cloak himself and the Russian state with an additional mantle of legitimacy.” In the justifications for invading Ukraine, useful history is busy at work. As Putin tells it, it’s not an invasion but a reunification; it’s not a violation of international law but the return of lawful possessions that were wrested away when the Cold War ended.

There is an unsubtle progression to <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2022/01/28/putin-russia-ukraine-myths/" target=_blank>Putin’s historical interpretations</a>. In July, the Russian president wrote that “true sovereignty of Ukraine is possible only in partnership with Russia,” which is, to say the least, a peculiar definition of sovereignty. In his speech on Feb. 21, he went further, asserting that Ukraine “actually never had stable traditions of real statehood.” Three days later, with the invasion seeming inevitable, the threat was reversed; Ukraine didn’t need Russian assistance to survive, but it and its Western allies posed an existential threat to Russian survival, “to the very existence of our state and to its sovereignty.”

Putin incessantly denounces the U.S. or NATO interventions of the post-Cold War world — particularly in the Balkans, Libya, Iraq and Syria — as intolerable aggressions. In a 2013 New York Times <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/12/opinion/putin-plea-for-caution-from-russia-on-syria.html">op-ed</a>, he warned against a U.S. strike on Syria, urging deference to the United Nations. “Under current international law, force is permitted only in self-defense, or by the decision of the Security Council,” he wrote. No wonder that, when deploying force himself, from Chechnya at the turn of the century to Ukraine today, Putin reliably invokes national self-defense. “The current events have nothing to do with a desire to infringe on the interests of Ukraine and the Ukrainian people,” he stated on Feb. 24. “They are connected with defending Russia from those who have taken Ukraine hostage.” The formula is simple: When you swing it, it’s a sword; when I swing it, it’s a shield.

Putin relies on standard populist rhetoric to justify his attack on Ukraine — corrupt Ukrainian elites, beholden to foreign influences, are looting the country and turning the people against their Russian brethren, he claims — and he blithely combines World War II-era threats (Nazis overrunning Ukraine) with those of the Cold War (Ukraine acquiring nukes). Talk about useful history. But his speeches on the eve of invasion made his underlying preoccupation clear, with Putin expending enormous time and vitriol on the United States. He sneered at the “low cultural standards” and “feeling of absolute superiority” of post-Cold War America, while emphasizing the “empire of lies” in contemporary U.S. politics. In particular, he reminded the world that the United States employed “the pretext of allegedly reliable information” about weapons of mass destruction to invade Iraq. He did so even while warning that Ukraine, as a puppet regime of the West, might deploy WMDs (which it agreed to give up in 1994 in exchange for protection from Russian invasion) against Russia. “Acquiring tactical nuclear weapons will be much easier for Ukraine than for some other states I am not going to mention here,” he declared. “We cannot but react to this real danger.” It’s not his only American echo. Putin sounds downright Trumpy when warning that Russia will respond to any foreign interference in Ukraine, “and the consequences will be such as you have never seen in your entire history.”

It’s almost like, while invading Ukraine, he’s trolling Washington — because both are his targets.

Casey Silvestri

Of course, the writings of a former KGB officer — or of any politician — should not be taken at face value; the purpose is to obscure as much as to reveal, the content is propaganda more than truth. Putin is a terrible communicator to begin with; according to “First Person,” his KGB instructors found him withdrawn and tight-lipped, and even his former wife understood him so poorly that, when he was proposing marriage, she thought he was breaking things off. But as with all political writing, propaganda is enlightening because it reveals something about how its purveyors wish to be perceived. Read in wartime, Putin’s accounts offer glimpses of the fighter he hopes the world will see in him, and the one he imagines himself to be.

Putin shares two stories in “First Person” that depict him as a risk-taker. He tells his interviewer that when he attended the KGB’s intelligence school, a supervisor noted his “lowered sense of danger” in one of his evaluations. “That was considered a very serious flaw,” Putin recalls. “You have to be pumped up in critical situations in order to react well. Fear is like pain. It’s an indicator. . . . I had to work on my sense of danger for a long time.” Message: He does not fear risk as ordinary people do.

He also recounts a time he was driving a car with a judo coach during his university days and saw a truck loaded with hay coming in the other direction. Putin reached out his window to grab some hay as he drove past, and he accidentally veered off course. “I turned the wheel sharply in the other direction,” Putin says, “and my rickety Zaporozhets went up on two wheels.” Somehow, they landed safely rather than crashing into a ditch. Only when they reached their destination did his astonished coach finally speak. “You take risks,” he said, and walked away. “What drew me to that truck?” Putin later wonders. “It must have been the sweet smell of the hay.” Message: Putin takes what he wants, regardless of the dangers to himself or others.

Yet a third story in “First Person,” from Putin’s childhood, places him in a less-daring light. There were rats in the apartment building where his family lived, and Putin and his friends would chase them with sticks. One day, he spotted a large rat and trapped it in a corner — but then it suddenly turned and jumped toward him. “I was surprised and frightened,” Putin recalls. “Now the rat was chasing me. It jumped across the landing and down the stairs. Luckily, I was a little faster and I managed to slam the door shut in its nose.” What’s the message here? That when Putin thinks he’s beaten a weaker foe, all it takes is his rival lashing out to get him to run away?

It’s an easy and tempting analogy. The apparent renewed unity of the transatlantic alliance against Putin’s assault on Ukraine, and the early resistance of Ukrainian forces and politicians, would seem to serve as a deterrent to a wider, longer war. But with Putin, it could just as well prompt further escalation. “If you become jittery, they will think that they are stronger,” he states in “First Person,” describing his attitude toward Russia’s enemies. “Only one thing works in such circumstances — to go on the offensive. You must hit first, and hit so hard that your opponent will not rise to his feet.”

For Putin, power must not be paralyzed. It must be wielded.

Carlos Lozada is The Post’s nonfiction book critic and the author of <a href="https://www.amazon.com/gp/product/1982145633?ie=UTF8&tag=thewaspos09-20&camp=1789&linkCode=xm2&creativeASIN=1982145633" target=_blank>“What Were We Thinking: A Brief Intellectual History of the Trump Era.”</a> Follow him <a href="https://twitter.com/CarlosLozadaWP">on Twitter</a> and read his <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/book-party/?tid=lk_inline_manual_30&tid=lk_inline_manual_28&itid=lk_inline_manual_28&tid=lk_inline_manual_33&itid=lk_inline_manual_33&itid=lk_inline_manual_35&itid=lk_inline_manual_37&itid=lk_inline_manual_37&itid=lk_inline_manual_34&itid=lk_inline_manual_38&itid=lk_inline_manual_39&itid=lk_inline_manual_34&itid=lk_inline_manual_29&itid=lk_inline_manual_31&itid=lk_inline_manual_32&itid=lk_inline_manual_23&itid=lk_inline_manual_23&itid=lk_inline_manual_31&itid=lk_inline_manual_48&itid=lk_inline_manual_31&itid=lk_inline_manual_27&itid=lk_inline_manual_26">recent book reviews</a>, including:

<a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2021/11/19/1619-project-book-history/?itid=lk_inline_manual_32&itid=lk_inline_manual_29&itid=lk_inline_manual_27">The 1619 Project started as history. Now it’s also a political program.</a>

<a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/interactive/2021/911-books-american-values/?itid=sf_book-party&itid=lk_inline_manual_49&itid=lk_inline_manual_33&itid=lk_inline_manual_30&itid=lk_inline_manual_28">9/11 was a test. The books of the last two decades show how America failed.</a>

<a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2022/02/03/insurgency-jeremy-peters/?itid=lk_inline_manual_29">How Trump’s political style smothered the last substance left in the GOP</a>

Winner, Pulitzer Prize for Criticism, 2019

Finalist, Pulitzer Prize for Criticism, 2018

Winner, National Book Critics Circle citation for excellence in reviewing, 2015

Knight-Bagehot fellow in business and economics journalism, Columbia University, 2004-05

University of Notre Dame, BA in economics and political science

Princeton University, Woodrow Wilson School, MPA in public and international affairs 

Carlos Lozada is the nonfiction book critic of The Washington Post and the author of "<a href="https://www.amazon.com/What-Were-We-Thinking-Intellectual/dp/1982145625">What Were We Thinking: A Brief Intellectual History of the Trump Era</a>." He won the Pulitzer Prize for criticism in 2019.

Carlos Lozada

washpost

How to Read Vladimir Putin

the-washington-post

Putin Inaugurates Monument To Alexander Nevsky And Heroes Of Lake Peipus Battle

Contributor

Getty Images

Getty

name

iptc-media/politics

iptc-media/science_and_technology/social_sciences

iptc-media/politics/international_relations

iptc-media/science_and_technology

iptc-media/politics/government

iptc-media/politics/political_process

iptc-media/conflict_war_and_peace/armed_conflict/war

iptc-media/politics/international_relations/diplomacy

iptc-media/politics/government/defence

iptc-media/science_and_technology/social_sciences/philosophy

client-blocklists/Client List: Becton Dickinson KWs - EXCLUDES ALL

client-blocklists/CLIENT LIST: Nomura KWs 2021 - EXCLUDES ALL

client-blocklists/Client List: Johnson & Johnson KWs - INCLUDES ANY

client-blocklists/Bed Bath & Beyond KWs - INCLUDE ANY

client-blocklists/Client List: Exxon Mobil  - INCLUDES ANY

client-blocklists/WaPo: Combined Disaster Keyword List - INCLUDES ANY

client-blocklists/Client List: USAA KWs - EXCLUDES ALL

client-blocklists/Client List: T. Rowe Price KWs - INCLUDES ANY

client-blocklists/Google PG KWs - INCLUDES ANY

client-blocklists/Client List: Microsoft KWs 2 - INCLUDES ANY

client-blocklists/T. Rowe Price KWs - INCLUDES ANY

advertising/B2_Automotive Interest 2.5.15_legacyaux_jqs

client-blocklists/HBO KWs - INCLUDES ANY

client-blocklists/Ford/Lincoln KWs - INCLUDES ANY

client-blocklists/Client List: Discover Card KWs – INCLUDES ANY

advertising/European Content

client-blocklists/Capital One (One Tech) KWs - INCLUDES ANY

client-blocklists/Louis Vuitton KW List - INCLUDES ANY

client-blocklists/Client List: Navy Federal Credit Union NFCU KWs 2 - INCLUDES ANY - 12.23.20

client-blocklists/Client List: Diageo - Johnnie Walker KWs - INCLUDES ANY

client-blocklists/ Client List: Mercedes EQS KWs - INCLUDES ANY

client-blocklists/FlexForm KW List - INCLUDES ANY

client-blocklists/Boeing KWs 2021- INCLUDE ANY

client-blocklists/Client List: Morgan Stanley KWs - INCLUDES ANY

client-blocklists/Client List: Organon KWs - INCLUDES ANY

client-blocklists/Client List: AT&T KWs 2021 - INCLUDES ANY

client-blocklists/Client List: Verizon KWs - INCLUDES ANY

client-blocklists/P+ Halo KW List - INCLUDES ANY

client-blocklists/Synchrony Financial KWs - INCLUDES ANY

client-blocklists/Client List: Ukraine-Russia (Apple News) KWs - INCLUDES ANY

advertising/Hybrid Work

client-blocklists/Client List: Showtime KWs - INCLUDES ANY

client-blocklists/Client List: Apple TV+ KW – INCLUDES ANY

client-blocklists/Client List: Ronald McDonald House KWs - INCLUDES ANY

client-blocklists/Client Neg KW List: Omega KWs - INCLUDES ANY

client-blocklists/PMI KWs 2021 - INCLUDES ANY

client-blocklists/Marcus Goldman Sachs Neg KW List - INCLUDES ANY

advertising/B2_Communities and Subcultures_legacyaux_ry3

advertising/B2_Community Service_legacyaux_h1s

client-blocklists/GEICO KWs - INCLUDES ANY_4.26.21

client-blocklists/Client List: Eli Lily KWs - INCLUDES ANY

advertising/B2_Culture and Tradition_legacyaux_kfx

advertising/B2_Cyber Security & Intelligence Community_legacyaux_E8X

advertising/B2_Defense_legacyaux_yxn

client-blocklists/Client List: Citibank KWs - INCLUDES ANY

client-blocklists/Citibank KWs 2021 - INCLUDES ANY

client-blocklists/Client List: Purina KWs - INCLUDES ANY

client-blocklists/SAP KW List - INCLUDES ANY

advertising/Qualcomm Custom KW - 5G

advertising/Citrix Mindfulness

client-blocklists/Client List: Fidelity Investments KWs - INCLUDES ANY

client-blocklists/Client List: Turbo Tax KWs - EXCLUDES ALL

advertising/B2_Government & Policy_legacyaux_mza

advertising/B2_Health and Beauty_legacyaux_3fv

client-blocklists/CME KW List 2022 - INCLUDES ANY

client-blocklists/Chase KWs - INCLUDES ANY

client-blocklists/Bank of America KWs - INCLUDES ANY

advertising/Client Keywords: On Running

client-blocklists/BP KWs - INCLUDES ANY

advertising/B2_International Conflicts & Relations_legacyaux_5l0

advertising/B2_International Relations_legacyaux_a8t

client-blocklists/National Instruments KWs - INCLUDES ANY

client-blocklists/Client List: Intel KWs - INCLUDES ANY

client-blocklists/Client List: AT&T Digital Divide  - INCLUDES ANY

client-blocklists/ExxonMobil 03312021 KWs - INCLUDES ALL

client-blocklists/Samsung 2021 KWs - INCLUDE ANY

advertising/B2_Positive News_legacyaux_hlt

advertising/B2_Russia & Putin_legacyaux_F55

client-blocklists/Google PG Competitor KWs - INCLUDES ANY

advertising/B2_Society_legacyaux_0cz

advertising/B2_Women's Beauty_legacyaux_9jv

advertising/Hitachi continuum

advertising/B2_Young Professional / International Businessman_legacyaux_r5x

advertising/B2_Men's Grooming_legacyaux_1ve

advertising/B2_Middle East Content_legacyaux_tde

client-blocklists/Client List: GEICO KWs

client-blocklists/Client List: KPMG KWs - EXCLUDES ALL

client-blocklists/Client List: Novo Nordisk KWs - EXCLUDES ALL

client-blocklists/Client List: Siemens KWs - EXCLUDES ALL

client-blocklists/Client List: Cisco KWs - INCLUDES ANY

client-blocklists/Client List: AT&T ALT KWs - INCLUDES ANY

client-blocklists/Mercedes KWs - INCLUDES ANY

client-blocklists/FX Excludes All Disney

client-blocklists/Client List: Inpixon KWs - INCLUDES ANY

client-blocklists/Client List: Boeing KWs - INCLUDES ANY

client-blocklists/Client List: Aetna KWs - EXCLUDES ALL

client-blocklists/Client List: Google KWs - INCLUDES ALL

client-blocklists/Philip Morris KWs - INCLUDES ANY 

client-blocklists/Capital One KWs 2 - INCLUDES ANY - 1.4.21

client-blocklists/Bank of America Merrill Lynch KWs - INCLUDES ANY

prism://prism.query/site,/opinions/book-party?limit=20

Book Party

Book Party is anchored by Carlos Lozada, a nonfiction critic for the Washington Post.

Sign up for the Prompt 2024 newsletter for opinions on the biggest questions in politics

Opinions

Washington Post Opinions

The Washington Post Opinions section features opinion articles, op-eds, editorials by the Editorial Board, global opinions and letters to the editor on the issues of the day. Offerings include columns by Washington Post opinion writers, political cartoons by editorial cartoonists Ann Telnaes and Michael de Adder and podcasts by Jonathan Capehart.